



Can German renewables become competitive within 5 years?

June 2018

Political ambitions for renewables to become competitive in the near term are high, but significant questions remain



The Minister for the Economy and Energy, Peter Altmaier, expects renewables to become competitive before 2023:

However, it is questionable if RES can become competitive this early in the current market design:

"Ich gehe davon aus, dass die erneuerbaren Energien in absehbarer Zeit, das heißt in den nächsten vier bis fünf Jahren, ihre Wettbewerbsfähigkeit vollständig erreicht haben, und dass wir dann imstande sein werden, erneuerbare Energien ohne zusätzliche Subventionen zu finanzieren"


"I assume that renewables will become fully competitive within the next four to five years, and that will be able to finance renewables without


subsidies by then"

- Will technology costs of renewables continue to decline fast enough?
- How does the 65% coalition target impact revenues of subsidy-free renewables?
- How will financing costs change for higher-risk merchant renewables and how are total project cost affected?
- What role can policy play in facilitating subsidyfree buildout?

The EEG 2017 has been a success in reducing costs for renewables...








After initial decline, price resurgence resumed after:

- privileges for "citizens' projects" (longer construction limits and no permit required) were suspended
- 65% RES target was introduced

Source: Aurora Energy Research, BNetzA

However, actual subsidies are higher than published results suggesting current projects are far from being competitive





Regional location factor

- Auction bids are given for a reference location (standardised windspeed)
- Actual guaranteed prices are corrected by a locationspecific factor to incentivise more distributed buildout


Location trend

- Average wind farm location at around 75 % of reference yield
- With increasing market saturation, quality of available location is likely to decrease further

¹⁾ Average price of successful bids (weighted by capacity) in May 2018 auction 2) Approximated based on locations of wind farm locations in 2012-14 3) 20 year nominal average capture price. (inflation projection 1.5% p.a.) Aurora Central Scenario

The 65% coalition target cannibalises market revenues of renewable plants






EUR/MWh real 2017, levelised average 2023

Capture price¹



This makes competitive RES before 2040 very unlikely




RES share in 2030,

%

1) Levelized capture price in 2023 2) market price achievable by wind onshore farm


A carbon price floor significantly increases certainty on 25-30% of revenues of a merchant asset and decreases capital costs





Subsidy-free renewables face significantly higher cost of capital than current supported investments under EEG






Notes: 1) Supported by low price floor covering some downside risk 2) Benefiting from additional priority via green certificates in the market 3) Benefiting from additional support via mandated renewable shares in generation portfolios

PPAs increase revenue certainty and lower cost of capital by up to 4 percentage points



PPA impact on cost of capital

- PPAs increase certainty of project's revenues and assure availability of cash flow for debt service
- Increased availability of cash flow to cover debt services enables higher debt share
- Higher (debt) leverage decreases cost of capital for the sponsor
- Reduced project risk decreases cost of equity and further lowers WACC
- Only with PPAs widely applied can they make a relevant impact on RES WACC and competitiveness
- System with higher liquidity and lower transaction cost (i.e. time and legal resources) for PPAs important for application throughout different sectors and scales



We assessed three policy options quantitively: status quo, PPAs and a carbon price floor under three market scenarios



Policy options

Market scenarios

Status quo

- Continuation of current EEG system
- Merchant RES at 10.5 % WACC when exceeding EEG build-out path

PPAs

- No EEG build-out past 2022
- Policy framework to create favourable conditions for PPA
- WACC of 7.5 %

Carbon price floor

- No EEG build-out past 2022
- Carbon price floor at 45 EUR/t to incentivise RES
- 9 % WACC due to lower uncertainty

Central

As in Aurora Central in particular

- Carbon price of 31 EUR/t in 2030
- Gas price of 27 EUR/MWh in 2030

High

As in Aurora Central except

- Carbon price of 52 EUR/t in 2030¹
- Gas price of 46 EUR/MWh in 2030

Low


As in Aurora Central except

- Carbon price of 8 EUR/t in 2030¹
- Gas price of 15 EUR/MWh in 2030

¹⁾ In carbon price floor scenario, minimum carbon price of 45 EUR/t ${\rm CO_2}$

Carbon price floor is most resilient against change in market conditions, other policies are comparably more cost effective






¹⁾ Remaining price components - e.g. grid charges & taxes - remain constant over scenarios. Legacy subsidies only charge marginally

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